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RESCINDING RATIFICATION OF PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENTS-A QUESTION FOR THE COURT
Since it was proposed by Congress in 1972, thirty-five state legisla-
tures have indicated their assent to the proposed Equal Rights Amend-
ment.' Three of these-Tennessee, Nebraska and Idaho-have passed
resolutions rescinding their ratifications. 2 Should three more states ratify,
it will become impossible to determine the content of the Constitution
without first deciding whether the rescissions were constitutionally per-
missible.
Rescission: The Original Understanding
Although the Constitution does not explicitly provide for rescission of
resolutions ratifying amendments,' it is reasonable to suggest that the
controversy is artificial, in light of the general rule that a legislative body
may rescind any of its own actions, at least until they have taken effect.4
Obviously, once three-quarters of the state legislatures have unequivocally
ratified an amendment and it has become effective as part of the Constitu-
tion, it can only be repealed by the normal amending process prescribed in
Article V. 5 In the absence, however, of some textual or logical limitation
on a legislature's right to withdraw its assent to a proposed amendment,
such power is implicit in the legislature's right to prescribe its own rules.
The tenth amendment to the Constitution would seem to buttress the
presumption in favor of such state legislative power. However, the power
1. 35 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 179 (Jan. 29, 1977).
2. Id.; Equal Rights Amendment Gains in Two States, N.Y. Times, Feb. 10,
1977, at 18.
3. "The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it neces-
sary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or on the Application of the
Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for propos-
ing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes,
as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three-fourths of the
several States, or by Conventions in three-fourths thereof, as the one or the other
Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amend-
ment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight
shall in any manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the
first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal
Suffrage in the Senate." U.S. CONST. art. V.
4. L. CUSHING, ELEMENTS OF THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF LEGISLATIVE AS-
SEMBLIES IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA § 1260 (Irish University Press reprint
1971) (1st ed. Boston 1856); cf. L. ORFIELD, AMENDING THE FEDERAL CONSTITU-
TION 67 (1942) [hereinafter cited as ORFIELD].
5. See ORFIELD, supra note 4, at 72.
COMMENTS
to ratify amendments to the Federal Constitution has been held to be a
"federal function" exercised by the state legislatures by virtue of a special
grant of power in Article V, and not a reserved power of the states under
the tenth amendment. 6 Notwithstanding this construction, state legisla-
tures may apply their own rules to the ratification procedure, 7 even
provisions requiring "super-majorities" for passage of ratification resolu-
tions.' A rule providing for rescission of resolutions would seem to be no
exception.
The most exhaustive attempt at a principled defense of the proposi-
tion that a legislature may not rescind its ratification was made by John
Alexander Jameson in his treatise on constitutional conventions. 9 Judge
Jameson found, in the constitutional provision that an amendment is valid
"when ratified" by three-fourths of the state legislatures, 10 a grant of
special power to each legislature which "when exercised. . . by ratifying
. . .ceases to be a power ...... I Passage by a legislature of a ratifying
resolution is, in this view, a sort of sacramental act, which may take only a
moment to consummate but which is forever binding on the legislature
(and on the whole nation).' 2 Jameson also advanced a reliance theory
according to which one state's ratification "induces" similar action by
other states. 3 Why this is true, or why it should make any difference so
long as any state so "induced" may restore itself to its original position by
rescinding its own ratification, was not explained.
In finding that a ratification becomes "effective" and therefore
irrevocable the moment it is passed by the legislature, Judge Jameson
blurred the distinction between one state's passage of a resolution, and the
completion of the whole process by which the amendment becomes a part
of the Constitution. Indeed, he professed to see no difference between
rescission before three-quarters of the states had ratified, and afterward; 14
6. Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130, 136-37 (1922); Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S.
221 (1920).
7. Since the state legislature is performing a "federal function" in ratifying, it
may make its own rules even where inconsistent with the state constitution. Dyer v.
Blair, 390 F. Supp. 1291 (N.D. Il. 1975) (Stevens, Cir. J.); cf. Leser v. Garnett, 258
U.S. 130, 137 (1922). See generally ORFIELD, supra note 4, at 61-78.
8. Dyer v. Blair, 390 F. Supp. 1291, esp. 1305 n.34 (N.D. I11. 1975) (Stevens,
Cir. J.).
9. J. JAMESON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS 629-33 (4th ed. 1887)
[hereinafter cited as JAMESON].
10. U.S. CONST. art. V.
11. JAMESON, supra note 9, at 628.
12. Id. at 632.
13. Id. at 632-33.
14. Id. at 633.
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and his horror of a theory which might justify secession (by a state's
"rescission" of the Constitution itself)15 virtually compelled his conclu-
sions. 16
Judge Jameson's arguments-and, as will be shown, all the impor-
tant precedents and authorities relied on by those who would deny a state
the right to rescind-are rooted in the philosophical and political currents
of the Reconstruction Era.17 Whatever the felt necessities of those times, it
is suggested that the framers of the Constitution probably intended, and
that the integrity of our constitutional structure certainly demands, that a
state be able to reconsider its ratification of a proposal which has not yet
become part of the Constitution.
In The Federalist No. 85, Hamilton argued that the amending proce-
dure was designed to ensure that "the will of the requisite number" should
prevail. 18 The Constitution would be amended "whenever [three-fourths
of the] States, were united in the desire of a particular amendment."' 19
This emphasis on consensus as the essential ingredient in the amending
process contrasts sharply with Jameson's assertion, a century later, that
the framers had intended each separate legislature's ratification to be
irrevocable, regardless of whether a consensus among the states ever
existed. If, for example, 38 state legislatures have ratified an amendment
over a seven-year period, but 20 of the 38 have rescinded their ratifica-
tions, it cannot be said that 38 states were ever "united in the desire" for
the amendment.
Those members of the Constitutional Convention who expressed their
feelings on the matter saw the amending process as a means of procuring
changes about which there was a broad consensus. 20 They rejected the
standard of unanimity as too difficult to achieve, 21 but felt that a substan-
tial minority of the states should be able to block changes favored by a
15. Id.
16. Jameson has been widely relied upon, apparently because he was first to
publish a comprehensive theory on ratifications and rescissions. But when a con-
temporary accused him of bias, he proudly replied that his work had been written,
"every line of it, literally, to the beating of the Union drums," expressly to refute
theories "which had made possible and easy the wicked revolt of the South." Id. at
657 (app. C).
17. See note 16, supra; text at notes 71-80, 86-89, 104, infra.
18. THE FEDERALIST No, 85 (A. Hamilton).
19. Id.
20. See id. No. 39 (J. Madison); No. 43 (J. Madison); No. 85 (A. Hamilton); 1
M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 476, 478 (rev.
ed. 1937) [hereinafter cited as FARRANDI.
21. See 1 FARRAND, supra note 20, at 476, 478; 3 id. at 120-21.
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majority,2 2 and were generally fearful of frequent amendments.23 Thus it
would seem that any ambiguity in the language of Article V ought to be
resolved in favor of the interpretation which would make it more difficult
to amend, and which would prevent change absent a sufficiently broad
consensus.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized consensus, and not
the formality of a certain number of isolated legislative acts, as the sine
qua non for ratification:
[A]s ratification is but the expression of the approbation of the people
and is to be effective when had in three-fourths of the states, there is a
fair implication that it must be sufficiently contemporaneous in that
number of states to reflect the will of the people in all sections at
relatively the same period .... 24
The Court's doctrine that an amendment proposed by Congress must
be ratified within a "reasonable time" is based on the possibility that after
such a period has elapsed, even if some states should ratify an "old"
proposal, other states which had ratified earlier might no longer be par-
ticipating in a current consensus. 25 A fortiori, if one or more states have
given a positive indication that they no longer support the amendment,
they cannot be said to be part of a consensus. 26
While disagreement exists on the merits of individual proposed
amendments, experience has strengthened the view that resort to the
amending process should be made only in extraordinary situations.27 Thus
the canon of construction proposed above-that ambiguities be resolved in
favor of the construction which would make amendment more difficult-
has been suggested in other contexts, not as a means of being faithful to
the precise wishes of the framers, but as a prudential means of protecting
the Constitution from hasty alterations which might not reflect an enduring
consensus. 28 One reflection of this attitude was the passage by the United
22. See 2 id. at 148, 555, 557-59, 629-31.
23. See 2 id. at 629-31; 3 id. at 127.
24. Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 375 (1921).
25. See ORFIELD, supra note 4, at 75-76.
26. See S. REP. No. 336, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1971).
27. See id. at 6; id. at 18-19 (separate views of Messrs. Bayh, Burdick, Hart,
Kennedy and Tunney). Cf. materials cited in note 28, infra.
28. See, e.g., Black, Amending the Constitution: A Letter to a Congressman,
82 YALE L. 189 (1972); Federal Constitutional Convention: Hearings on S. 2307
before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Comm. on the Judiciary,
United States Senate, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 60, esp. 60-61, 67 (1967) (statement of
Alexander Bickel) [hereinafter cited as 1967 Hearings]; id. at 237-38 (memorandum
by Robert G. McCloskey). Professor McCloskey suggests "the amending process
1977]
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States Senate, in 1973, of a measure expressing support for the view that a
state ought to be able to rescind its ratification. 29
The view that Article V should be read to permit rescission is further
strengthened by the general construction of that Article as allowing a state
to ratify an amendment after a prior negative action. 30 It is difficult to
conceive of the Constitutional Convention promulgating a plan by which
pro-amending forces have the unlimited opportunity to bounce back from
a defeat, while denying the same right to those who prefer to keep the
Constitution as it is. 3
In view of the foregoing, it is not surprising that the validity of the
recent rescissions has not been challenged on the merits. Apparently, no
one now claims that the Constitution compels state ratifications to be
irrevocable. Rather, the issue has been labelled a "political question," to
be resolved by Congress, whose decision on the matter will not be
questioned by the courts. Yet no court has ever confronted the issue, and
the authorities cited for the proposition are at best questionable.32
Political Questions: Principle or Pretext?
Controversy as to the proper scope of the "political questions"
doctrine is inextricable from the debate over the foundations of judicial
should be made as difficult as the language and intent of the Constitution will
permit. We have the oldest stable constitutional system in the world; and I think its
stability is related to its . . . relative immutability." Id. at 238.
29. 119 CONG. REC. 22731-37 (1973). The bill sought, inter alia, to enact into law
the states' right to rescind ratifications of proposed amendments. S. 1272, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. § 13(a) (1973). It died in the House Judiciary Committee. See 119
CONG. REC. 23138 (1973). Even had the bill been enacted, it could not have had the
force of law, since: (1) if the Constitution compels either result on the rescission
question, the bill could neither modify nor add anything to the constitutional rule;
(2) if Congress can make the rules about rescission, then a mere statute would not
be binding on future Congresses, whose own legislative acts would automatically
repeal any prior inconsistent legislation. Cf. Black, supra note 28, at 192. Passage
by the Senate of the measure favoring the state right to rescind is important,
however, as the last expression by either House, outside thie context of the E.R.A.
controversy, on the fairness and desirability of the rule.
30. See JAMESON, supra note 9, at 624-29; ORFIELD, supra note 4, at 70-71.
Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939), held the effect of a prior rejection to be a
political question to be resolved by Congress-but even if this holding is still valid,
Congress in theory is obliged to honor any rule implicit in the Constitution. See
discussion of Coleman in the text at notes 94-121, esp. 118-19, infra.
31. See ORFIELD, supra note 4, at 72 & n.108.
32. Even outside the context of the current controversy, most commentators
have presumed the question of rescission to be non-justiciable; the presumption is
based not on text, history or logic, but on the dubious precedents discussed in the
text at notes 71-85 & 94-170, infra. See, e.g., ORFIELD, supra note 4, at 26 & n.68.
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review. 33 The classical justification for judicial review-the "private
rights model" grounded in Marbury v. Madison 3 4-is that the Supreme
Court is the highest court in the land. As such, the Court has a duty to
vindicate the rights of private parties. When the outcome of a case within
the Court's jurisdiction must turn on a construction of the Constitution, the
Court is bound to decide what the Constitution says about the case.
Whenever the Court has the power to interpret the Constitution, it also has
a duty to exercise that power.35 Therefore, when the Court labels a
question "political" it has already interpreted the Constitution and deter-
mined either (1) that the Constitution has given the political branch
unlimited freedom of action in a certain area, so that nothing it could do in
this area would be unconstitutional; or (2) that while a certain action of the
political branch might be unconstitutional, the Constitution has given that
branch the authority to adjudicate the question, so that the Court has no
power to decide whether the action was constitutional.36 In the first
category are, inter alia, the President's power to recognize any foreign
government he wishes37 and the power of the political branch to decide
when a certain expenditure is for the "general welfare."38 In the second
category-the only "true political questions" wherein the Court refrains
from evaluating the constitutionality of a decision made by another branch-
are Congress's right to judge the qualifications of its own members, 39
and the impeachment process. 4 In the classical view, once a case is
properly before the Court, its duty to decide all issues can only be
33. See Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional
Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517 (1966); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Con-
stitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).
34. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
35. This Comment will not discuss the principles underlying certiorari jurisdic-
tion. The discussion here should be understood to apply once a case is before the
Court, whether on appeal or certiorari. See Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the
"Passive Virtues"--A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 24-25 (1964).
36. See Wechsler, supra note 33, at 9.
37. "[H]e shall . . .receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers ..
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. See LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
SERVICE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA REVISED AND
ANNOTATED 541-44 (1973 ed.) [hereinafter cited as CONSTITUTION ANNOTATED].
38. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. i. See CONSTITUTION ANNOTATED, supra note
37, at 136-41.
39. "Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifica-
tions of its own Members. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 5. See Wechsler, supra note
33, at 8.
40. See U.S. CONST. art. I § 3, cl. 6; Wechsler, supra note 33, at 8.
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superseded by a clear, "textually demonstrable" grant of adjudicative
power to some other institution.
41
Marbury did not assert that the Court's duty to construe the Constitu-
tion was unique within the structure of government; in the private-rights
model, the views of the Supreme Court will prevail over those of the other
branches primarily because of the Court's power to issue writs which other
officials are bound to obey.42 Modern theorists, on the other hand, em-
phasize not the Court's duty to litigants who happen to be before it, but the
Court's special role as the pre-eminent interpreter of the Constitution.43 As
these same theorists have come to reject the idea of a "mechanical"
application of the text of the Constitution to modern problems, the Court
has been pictured as an institution with the unique mission of making
principled value judgments about legislative and executive decisions."
This "special function model" has obvious consequences for the political
questions doctrine: if the Court is to be concerned primarily with the
long-range effects that its decisions have on society, rather than with strict
fidelity to the text of the Constitution in adjudicating certain private
disputes, then it is free to choose carefully the areas in which it will render
judgments.45 In order to enhance its own effectiveness as a social institu-
tion, the Court may want to avoid certain areas altogether--especially
areas in which the public, or the other branches of government, might
resist its authority. 46
Professor Bickel saw the political questions doctrine as the ultimate
weapon in the Supreme Court's arsenal of discretionary devices for avoid-
ing constitutional adjudication.4 Rejecting the classical view, he argued
that
only by means of a play on words can the broad discretion that the
courts have in fact exercised be turned into an act of constitutional
interpretation governed by the general standards of the interpretive
41. See Wechsler, supra note 33, at 7-9. A commitment strongly implied by the
text of the Constitution would meet this standard; Professor Wechsler suggests that
the Guaranty Clause includes such an implicit commitment. Id. at 8. Cf. the text at
notes 64-70, infra.
42. See 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 147 (1803).
43. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 1-33 (1962)
[hereinafter cited as BICKEL].
44. See, id., passim, esp. 58. See generally G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 1532-35 (1975) [hereinafter cited as GUNTHER].
45. See BICKEL, supra note 43 passim; Scharpf, supra note 33, at 549-66.
46. Cf. Scharpf, supra note 33, 549-55.
47. BICKEL, supra note 43, at 183.
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process. The political-question doctrine simply resists being domesti-
cated in this fashion. There is . . . about it . . . something greatly
more flexible, something of prudence, not construction and not
principle. And it is something that cannot exist within the four
corners of Marbury v. Madison.
48
In Baker v. Carr,4 9 Justice Brennan made an attempt to "domesti-
cate" the political questions doctrine by calling it
essentially a function of the separation of powers. Prominent on the
surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable
and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of
deciding without an . . . initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the
respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need
for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or
the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements
by various departments on one question.5 °
Although Justice Brennan began by tying the doctrine to the constitutional
limits on the Court's powers, the criteria he specified seem more consist-
ent with the view that there are "prudential" political questions. Only the
criterion of "textually demonstrable constitutional commitment" is truly
consistent with the classical view of the political question. 5' In a case
where there is a total absence of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards, or where it is literally impossible to decide a case without
impermissible policy judgments, the political questions doctrine would
seem superfluous, since it is difficult to imagine how a plaintiff in such a
case could prove an actual violation of a specific constitutional right. In
the other instances listed by Justice Brennan, the classical view of judicial
review would call for a decision by the Court.
It is probable, however, that Justice Brennan was attempting merely
to summarize the history of the political questions doctrine. As will be
shown,52 the holding in Baker v. Carr itself, as well as the modern
48. Id. at 125-26.
49. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
50. Id. at 217.
51. See the text & note 41, supra.
52. See the text at notes 139-66, infra.
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Court's treatment of other matters involving the political process, suggest
that the doctrine is much narrower than Justice Brennan's thesis statement
implies.
The Justiciability of the Amending Process
There is nothing in Article V to suggest that whether a constitutional
amendment has been ratified is a political question.53 Congress is given
the power (but not the sole power) to propose amendments for ratification
by the states54 and to choose whether ratification will be by state legisla-
tures or by state conventions.5 5 These are not adjudicative functions, 56 and
there is no language comparable to that granting the Senate power to
"try" impeachments and render "judgment" therein 57 or to the provision
that "[e]ach house shall be the Judge" of its members' qualifications. 5" It
is reasonable to suppose that the "necessary and proper" clause 59 of the
Constitution grants Congress the power to provide for promulgation of
amendments and other "housekeeping" matters;' but it should be equally
clear that no such "housekeeping" measure can be used as a pretext for
substantive restrictions on the power granted to the states by Article V. 6 1
In Hollingsworth v. Virginia,62 decided in 1798, the Supreme Court
indicated that questions about the amending process are justiciable rather
than political. The plaintiff contended that the eleventh amendment had
not been properly adopted, since the President had not been given the
opportunity to sign or veto the Congressional resolution proposing the
amendment. Defendant argued that the Constitution gives the President no
role in the amending process. Apparently, neither the Court nor the parties
entertained the idea that this question of law ought to be decided by
53. See ORFIELD, supra note 4, at.13.
54. U.S. CONST. art. V.
55. Id.
56. Cf. Scharpf, supra note 33, at 539-40.
57. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
58. Id. art. 1, § 5.
59. Id. art. I, § 8, ci. 18.
60. See Comment, Proposed Legislation on the Convention Method of Amend-
ing the Constitution, 8 HARV. L. REV. 1612, 1617-18 (1972). Current legislation
gives the duty of promulgating amendments which have been ratified to someone
called the Administrator of General Services. See 1 U.S.C. §§ 106b, 112 (1970).
Prior to 1951, the Secretary of State was responsible for promulgating amendments.
3 Stat. 439 (1818); 65 Stat. 710-11 (1951).
61. See ORFIELD, supra note 4, at 63-65; cf. Proposed Legislation, supra note
60, at 1618.
62. 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 378 (1798).
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another branch of government; the Court held that the amendment had
become part of the Constitution. 63
Luther v. Borden,64 a major political questions case decided by the
Court in 1849, contains a remark 65 which commentators have regarded as
a dictum to the effect that the Court will let Congress decide whether states
have ratified amendments to the Federal Constitution. 66 The case has
nothing to do with such amendments, however; and the statement makes
perfect sense when construed as part of the case's holding that Congress
would be allowed to decide which of two rival state governments was the
legitimate one, and therefore which state constitution was in effect. 67
Luther v. Borden rested in part upon a construction of the Guaranty
Clause, 68 and in part upon the idea that the right of Congress to seat its
own members implicitly included a right to "recognize" state govern-
ments. 69 It cannot easily be construed as acknowledging a Congressional
veto power over the procedures of state governments whose legitimacy is
unquestioned.
70
Yet there was an instance in which Congress exercised just such a
veto power without being directly rebuked by the courts. On July 20,
1868, Secretary of State William Seward announced that he had received
documents from legislatures in at least three-fourths of the states purport-
ing to certify ratification of the fourteenth amendment. 7 He noted, how-
ever, that he had also received official notice that Ohio and New Jersey
63. Id. at 381. It cannot logically be maintained that the issue of justiciability
was not before the Court, merely because no party argued that the validity of the
amendment was non-justiciable. If the question were not justiciable, by definition
the Court would be bound not to decide it.
64. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
65. "In forming the constitutions of the different States, after the Declaration
of Independence, and in the various changes and alterations which have since been
made, the Political Department has always determined whether the proposed con-
stitution or amendment was ratified or not by the people of the State, and the
judicial power has followed its decision." Id. at 39.
66. See, e.g., ORFIELD, supra note 4, at 8; Clark, The Supreme Court and the
Amending Process, 39 VA. L. REV. 621, 630 (1953); Dodd, Amending the Federal
Constitution, 30 YALE L.J. 321, 327 (1921).
67. The statement cannot be regarded even as a dictum on Federal amend-
ments, since it did not even purport to say anything about such amendments. See
Dyer v. Blair, 390 F. Supp. 1291, 1299-1300 n.20 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (Stevens, Cir. J.).
68. 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 42-46.
69. Id. at 42..
70. See Dyer v. Blair, 390 F. Supp. 1291, 1299-1300 n.20 (N.D. Il. 1975)
(Stevens, Cir. J.).
71. 15 Stat. 706 (1868).
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had withdrawn their consent to the amendment. Expressing his "doubt
and uncertainty" as to the legality of these resolutions, he certified that if
the Ohio and New Jersey ratifications were still in force, the amendment
was valid as part of the Constitution.
On the following day, both houses of Congress passed a resolution
declaring that three-fourths of the states, including Ohio and New Jersey,
had ratified and that the amendment was part of the constitution.7 2 The
record of the proceedings suggests bluntly that the Republican majority
neither knew nor cared whether the Constitution gave states the right to
rescind. The Senate passed the resolution without debate and without a
roll-call vote." In the House, the entire debate appears to have lasted only
a minute or two.74 A Massachusetts Republican moved to send the resolu-
tion, not to the Judiciary Committee, but to the Committee on Reconstruc-
tion. A Democrat protested that "it is an important question, and should
go to the committee on the Judiciary." The Republican floor leader then
indicated that his intention was to "pass it now," without any committee
consideration at all. After some discussion of the idea of adding Georgia to
the list (on the strength of a telegram in the possession of the Speaker
which a Democrat suggested was a fabrication),75 the resolution was
passed by a near-perfect party line vote.76 The Congressmen who voted
that Ohio and New Jersey could not rescind were, virtually man for man,
those who five months earlier had voted to impeach President Andrew
Johnson for his refusal to obey unconstitutional orders. 77
72. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 4266, 4295-96 (1868).
73. The Senate had previously debated the legality of the Ohio rescission, but
its validity was opposed primarily on the theory that-the Southern states being
ineligible to participate-three-fourths of the states had already ratified, making the
amendment already a part of the Constitution prior to the Ohio rescission. Id. at
876-78.
74. Id. at 4295-96.
75. Id. at 4296. Georgia actually ratified that day. H. Doc. No. 124, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1967). However, the Speaker's ambivalent attitude toward the
telegram suggests it may have been previously prepared, in anticipation of a
favorable Georgia vote.
76. The vote was 127 in favor, 33 opposed. Only one Republican voted with the
Democratic minority against the resolution. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess.
4296 (1868); S. Doc. No. 8, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE
AMERICAN CONGRESS, 1774-1971 passim (1971).
77. Compare CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 1402 (1868) with id. at 4296.
Except for absentees-and for the one Republican mentioned in note 76, supra-
the two votes were identical. For a discussion of the constitutionality of Johnson's
impeachment, see R. BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS
252-96 (1973).
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It should be emphasized that this Congressional action was never
tested in court. By the time the Supreme Court was called upon to construe
the fourteenth amendment, in the 1873 Slaughterhouse Cases,78 four
additional states had ratified the amendment 79 so that ratification vel non
by Ohio and New Jersey was a moot point.80
Apparently, the resolution of the Reconstruction Congress was not
regarded as an important precedent even by contemporaries. 8' The discus-
sion over including Georgia-whose ratification would have brought the
total to three-fourths even without Ohio and New Jersey 82 - suggests that
the Republican leadership was not entirely confident the gambit would
succeed. Moreover, two years later New York rescinded its ratification of
the fifteenth amendment,83 and the Secretary of State did not certify the
amendment as valid until enough states had ratified so that New York's
78. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
79. H. Doc. No. 124, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1967).
80. Another question about the validity of the adoption of the fourteenth amend-
ment-the fact that the Reconstruction Act compelled the Southern states to ratify
as a condition of readmission to the Union-was not mooted by the subsequent
ratifications, since it involved more than four states. See Suthon, The Dubious
Origin of the Fourteenth Amendment, 28 TUL. L. REV. 22 (1953). However in White
v. Hart, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 646, 649 (1872), the Court indicated in dictum that such a
ratification was "a voluntary and valid offering," apparently alluding to the fact
that ratification was a quid pro quo which Georgia was technically free not to
deliver. In context, it is clear that the Court addressed the merits of the question,
and did not, as has been suggested (see, e.g., ORFIELD, supra note 4, at 16), mean to
say that ratification is a political question. Other arguments for the validity of the
Civil War Amendments are that they have been adopted by usage or acquiescence;
that they were adopted by implication when the twenty-first amendment was
adopted, since it specified the eighteenth by its number, implicitly acknowledging
prior amendments as valid; or that the Southern states really did legally secede from
the Union, and were thereafter only conquered territories, so that only three-
fourths of the "loyal states" were needed to ratify. See generally United States v.
Gugel, 119 F. Supp. 897 (E.D. Ky. 1954); CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess.
876-78 (1868); ORFIELD, supra note 4, at 73-74, 78-81. In short, abandonment of the
idea that the Court will not review the procedure by which new amendments are
adopted would not make it necessary to jettison the fourteenth amendment.
81. See Corwin & Ramsey, The Constitutional Law of Constitutional Amend-
ment, 26 NOTRE DAME LAW. 183, 204-06 (1951).
82. Twenty-eight states were required, assuming all thirty-seven (including the
old Confederacy as well as West Virginia, created without the consent of Virginia's
Confederate government) were eligible to participate. Without Georgia or either of
the two rescinding states, the total number of ratifications was only twenty-seven.
See 15 Stat. 706, 707 (1868).
83. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 377 (1870).
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action was moot.84 Shortly thereafter, the Senate twice rejected attempts to
declare that no state might rescind its ratification of any future amend-
ment. 8
5
The next amendment whose validity was questioned before the Court
was the eighteenth. In The National Prohibition. Cases,86 the Solicitor
General, and Charles Evans Hughes as amicus for several states, argued
that the challenges were non-justiciable.87 The principal authorities for this
contention appear to have been the Congressional resolution of 1868,88
and Judge Jameson's statement that, while the Court has the power to
decide the validity of an amendment, "perhaps" the Court "ought" to
accept the judgment of Congress in order to avoid a "spectacle." 89 The
state courts, however, which had handled a large volume of litigation
involving the validity of state constitutions and amendments, had been
virtually unanimous in holding amending procedures subject to judicial
review.' Implicitly rejecting the suggestion that it had no power to
adjudicate the issues, the Court decided all questions in the eight cases
before it-including questions about the procedures Article V requires of
Congress as well as of state legislatures.
The Coleman Decision: Hard Cases Make Bad Law
In several subsequent cases involving the validity of the eighteenth
and nineteenth amendments, the Court decided further legal questions
involving the amending process. 91 By the 1930's, a review of a line of
84. Id. at 1477. The proclamation listed New York among states which "had
ratified," and added that the New York legislature had passed resolutions "claim-
ing to withdraw" its ratification. Id. at 2290.
85. See id. at 3971; id., 3d Sess. at 1381 (1871).
86. 253 U.S. 350 (1920).
87. See Dodd, supra note 66, at 323.
88. See id. at 323, 346.
89. JAMESON, supra note 9, at 627. See Dodd, supra note 66, at 323.
90. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Cornish, 83 N.J.L. 696, 85 A. 240 (1912); Collier v.
Frierson, 24 Ala. 100 (1854). See generally ORFIELD, supra note 4, at 14-15; Dodd,
supra note 66, at 323, 327.
91. In Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221 (1920), a companion to the National
Prohibition Cases (see the text at notes 86-90, supra), the Court held that ratifica-
tion is a power bestowed by the Constitution directly on state legislatures or state
conventions, and not on the states themselves, so that the states may not restrict
their legislatures as to ratification. In Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368 (1921), the Court
held that Article V requires amendments to be ratified within a "reasonable time";
that Congress may prescribe a time when proposing an amendment, provided the
time is actually reasonable; that seven years was reasonable; and that an amend-
ment is part of the Constitution as of the time the necessary states have ratified, not
as of the time of proclamation by the Secretary of State.
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Court decisions spanning three centuries should have compelled the con-
clusion that the Court's duty "to say what the law is" 92 included the duty
to pass on the constitutionality of amending procedures. 93 Yet in 1939, the
Court in Coleman v. Miller 94 -without purporting to reverse prior juris-
prudence95-injected the political questions doctrine into the ratification
process. The case does not easily yield its precise holdings, and the
reasons and authorities which might have persuaded a majority of the
Court on any point are even more difficult to discern. Only two Justices
joined Chief Justice Hughes in the statement styled "the opinion of the
Court"; 96 the divisions in the Court were "sufficient to confound prophets
of all schools.....
In Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130 (1922), the Court held the nineteenth amend-
ment to be validly adopted, over an argument that Article V imposes substantive
limitations as to what type of amendments may be made to the Constitution.
Plaintiffs also alleged that two state legislatures had violated their own rules, and
thus had not validly adopted the amendment; but the Court held that notice by the
proper legislative officials to the Secretary of State was binding on him, and "being
certified" by him, on the courts. Id. at 137. This holding was later misconstrued as
an endorsement of the political questions doctrine (see the text at notes 115-17,
infra); but since it purported only to indicate what sort of evidence courts would
accept to prove legislative actions, and since it assumed the Secretary of State to be
performing a ministerial function, consistent with the true wishes of the legislature,
it certainly cannot be read as acknowledging in the Secretary (much less in Con-
gress) any discretion to derogate from state legislative intentions, or to decide
questions of constitutional law. That Leser signalled no departure from the doctrine
of the justiciability of the amending process is confirmed by the Court's holding in
United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716 (1931), that the power of Congress to choose
between ratification by legislatures or conventions is based on "the plain language
of article 5." Id. at 729. Far from finding limitations on judicial power to review
that article, the Court announced canons of construction to be applied to Article V
in the same manner as to other constitutional provisions. Id. at 731-32.
92. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803).
93. It is significant that a book written in 1936, then apparently the only attempt
to catalogue all political questions, (see Scharpf, supra note 33, at 517 n.*) did not
mention the amending process, not even as a potential source of such questions. C.
POST, THE SUPREME COURT AND POLITICAL QUESTIONS (1936).
94. 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
95. The opinion of the Court referred, with apparent approval, to Dillon and
Leser. Id. at 451-53. Justice Black criticized the Court for its inconsistency in not
overruling Dillon. Id. at 458.
96. Id. at 435. Justices Black, Roberts, Frankfurter and Douglas dissented on
the threshold question of standing, which consumed the bulk of the Court's opin-
ion. Id. at 437-46, 456-57, 460-70. Justices Butler and McReynolds joined the
opinion of the Court as to standing, but dissented on the merits. Id. at 470-74. Only
Justices Stone and Reed joined Chief Justice Hughes on all issues.
97. Note, 48 YALE L.J. 1455 (1939). See note 96, supra.
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Coleman involved a constitutional amendment proposed by Congress
in 1924 to overrule a controversial Supreme Court decision on child
labor.98 At first, few states had ratified the amendment, and many had
rejected it. 99 After nine years, however, there was a surge of interest in the
child labor amendment: between 1933 and 1937 twenty-two states
ratified, bringing the total to twenty-eight, only eight short of the required
number."0 Kansas legislators who had opposed ratification sued in state
court to enjoin state officials from certifying that Kansas had ratified.
They claimed the Kansas resolution was invalid on three grounds: (1) a
"reasonable time" had elapsed between the proposal by Congress in 1924
and the ratification by Kansas in 1937; (2) Kansas had passed a resolution
rejecting the amendment, and they argued that this barred the state from
subsequently ratifying; (3) the Lieutenant Governor had cast a tie-breaking
vote in favor of the resolution, an act which the plaintiffs suggested was
unconstitutional. The Court affirmed a judgment of the Kansas Supreme
Court rejecting these attacks on the resolution.' 0 '
Chief Justice Hughes' opinion held the question whether a reasonable
time had elapsed to be a political question, not on the basis of a textually
demonstrable commitment of the adjudication of this issue to Congress,
but because such a determination would involve "an appraisal of a great
variety of relevant conditions, political, social and economic . "... "2
The opinion points out that Congress could have prescribed a "reasonable
time" when it proposed the amendment, and implies that an evaluation of
the salient conditions is essentially the same kind of judgment whether it is
made in advance or after attempted ratification by three-fourths of the
states. 103
Declaring that the effect of a previous rejection on a subsequent
ratification should also be decided by Congress, the Hughes opinion relied
on the precedent set by the Reconstruction Congress in 1868, adding
cryptically that "[tihis decision by the political departments of the Gov-
ernment . . . has been accepted."1"
98. 43 Stat. 670 (1924); see Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 435 & n.1 (1939).
The amendment would have effectively overruled Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S.
251 (1918). See Scharpf, supra note 33, at 587.
99. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 473 n.* (1939) (Butler, J., dissenting).
100. See id. Thirty-six of the forty-eight states were required.
101. 307 U.S. at 433-37.
102. Id. at 453.
103. Id. at 453-54. But see the text at notes 107-09, infra.
104. Id. at 449-50. The court obliquely suggested a theoretical basis for its
acceptance of the Reconstruction precedent when it added that "in accordance with
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The Court was evenly divided on whether the legality of the Lieuten-
ant Governor's participation was a justiciable or a political question.' 0 5
The effect of this non-decision was to deprive the Hughes opinion of any
consistency, since evidently all three Justices subscribing to it voted to
decide on the merits as to the Lieutenant Governor's role.' 0 6 These
Justices, therefore, believed the Court powerless to decide whether a
state's ratification is invalid on account of the lapse of a reasonable time (a
mixed question of law and fact), or on account of a prior rejection (a
question of law); but held the same Court competent to decide whether the
same ratification is invalid because of the participation of the Lieutenant
Governor (also a question of law).
Trying to unravel Coleman v. Miller, a contemporary observer
suggested a rational basis for the Hughes opinion: on this particular set of
facts, the effect of Kansas' prior rejection may have been "too closely
linked with the time allowable for ratification" to allow resolution of the
two issues in separate fora. °7 This view is especially plausible if the
power to define a "reasonable time" is seen as a corollary of the power to
propose amendments. A body having the power to propose may also have
the power to limit the life of its proposals;' 08 there is no reason to insist
that the limitation be stated in years. An alternative formula, stating that a
reasonable time would expire after seven years or at the occurrence of a
certain event, whichever comes first, might be desirable-particularly if
the event, such as rejection of the amendment, might indicate the expira-
tion of a consensus.
Acknowledging that Congress has the power to include limitations in
its own proposals does not necessarily imply a Congressional right to
impose such limitations retroactively after a number of states have ratified.
However, if the question before the Court involves divining past legisla-
tive intent-what limitations Congress intended when it proposed the
this historic precedent" the efficacy of ratification after rejection would be a
political question, "with the ultimate authority, in the Congress in the exercise of its
control over the promulgation of the adoption of the amendment." Id. at 450. Yet
to the exact extent that Congressional control over promulgation is more than an
implied "housekeeping" power, it needs a principled defense, which the Court did
not attempt. See the text at notes 59-61, supra and materials cited in note 61, supra.
105. 307 U.S. at 446-47.
106. The four Justices joining in the Black opinion regarded the question as
political. Id. at 456-60. Apparently Justice McReynolds was absent for discussion
of this issue. See Note, 28 GEO. L.J. 199, 200 n.7. Thus Chief Justice Hughes and
Justices Stone, Reed and Butler must have found it justiciable.
107. ORFIELD, supra note 4, at 20.
108. See Dodd, supra note 66, at 341.
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amendment, both as to time and as to the effect of a rejection-then
deferring to the judgment of Congress on these facts is not the same as
abrogating the power to decide questions of law."' Under this analysis,
the three Justices' willingness to adjudicate the Lieutenant Governor issue
is defensible, since this was a question of constitutional law unrelated to
any power granted to Congress by Article V.
The question whether a state may rescind its ratification, unlike the
question whether a rejection causes a reasonable time to elapse, cannot be
rationally included within Congress' power to propose amendments. If
Congress were to decide against rescission, it would not be limiting its
own proposal; rather, it would be "bootstrapping" a constitutional con-
sensus where none exists. If the Hughes opinion in Coleman v. Miller was
based on the Congressional power to define a reasonable time, therefore,
the citation of the Reconstruction precedent was unnecessary and inap-
propriate. If not, the apparent endorsement of that precedent must still be
regarded as mere dictum on the question of rescission, which was not
before the Court in Coleman.
Justice Black's concurring opinion"' in Coleman is not so easily
dispensed with.' 1 ' Joined by Justices Roberts, Frankfurter and Douglas,
he advanced an internally consistent theory:
Undivided control of [the amending] process has been given by...
Article [V] exclusively and completely to Congress. The process
itself is "political" in its entirety, from submission until an amend-
ment becomes part of the Constitution, and is not subject to judicial
guidance, control or interference at any point. 1
12
Resting his opinion on a "textually demonstrable constitutional com-
mitment" rather than on any difficulties the Court might have in deciding,
Justice Black might have cited the constitutional language on which he
based his conclusion. Yet he cited no such language, for the simple reason
that nothing in Article V suggests that its interpretation should be handled
109. This distinction is suggested by then-Judge Stevens' opinion in Dyer v.
Blair, 390 F. Supp. 1291, 1301-03 & n.24 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
110. 307 U.S. at 456-60.
111. A technical basis for diminishing the weight accorded to the Black opinion,
however, is that after these Justices stated their belief that plaintiffs had no
standing (307 U.S. at 456), everything that followed was unnecessary to decision,
and therefore mere dictum. In Dyer v. Blair, 390 F. Supp. 1291 (N.D. Ill. 1975),
then-Judge Stevens also felt bound to disregard the Black opinion since "a majority
of the Court refused to accept" it, and since it was inconsistent with prior Supreme
Court holdings. Id. at 1299-1300.
112. 307 U.S. at 459.
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differently from the interpretation of other parts of the Constitution. 3 Nor
did Justice Black cite any historical materials showing that the framers
meant to give Congress authority to bind the Court as to construction of
Article V. Indeed, the available records suggest exactly the contrary. 4
The Black opinion cited only one authority which related to constitu-
tional amendments: a flagrant misquotation of Leser v. Garnett."5 That
case held "notice" from "the Legislatures of Tennessee and of West
Virginia," certified to by the Secretary of State, "conclusive upon the
courts." 116 Justice Black translated thus:
Final determination by Congress that ratification by three-fourths of
the States has taken place "is conclusive upon the courts."- 1 7
It should be stressed that Justice Black was not arguing that Congress
has broad discretion to act under Article V; he affirmed that Congress "is
governed by the Constitution." "I8 Rather, he saw the courts as conclusive-
ly bound by an adjudication by Congress that its own action was constitu-
tional. 19 To pose the extreme case, if Congress were to propose an
amendment, then immediately declare that it had been ratified by the
states-when in fact the world could see that not a single state had
ratified-the courts would be powerless to declare the amendment invalid,
and would be bound to decide future cases as though the amendment were
part of the Constitution. The only answer to such a theory is that it is dead
wrong. It might also be very dangerous.
Judging Amendments: A Functional Analysis
The concurring opinion in Coleman could not have been written by
the Hugo Black we now remember, whose very critics remarked on his
zeal for fidelity to the text of the Constitution and the intention of the
framers. Rather, it was written by the former New Deal Senator who had
come to the Court with a mission. Indeed, the votes of all nine Justices in
Coleman might best be explained by reference to the contemporary con-
troversy over the Court's role as a "counter-majoritarian" institution.120
113. See ORFIELD, supra note 4, at 13; Proposed Legislation, supra note 60, at
1637-38.
114. See the text at notes 133-37, infra.
.115. 258 U.S. 130 (1922). See 307 U.S. at 457 & n.2.
116. 258 U.S. at 137.
117. 307 U.S. at 457 (emphasis added). But see note 91, supra.
118. Id.
119. See id. at 457-59.
120. Justices Butler and McReynolds, the remnant of the "four horsemen" who
had stricken New Deal legislation on substantive due process grounds, felt the
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The Child Labor Amendment was proposed in order to overrule a Supreme
Court decision imposing substantive due process limitations on the right of
Congress to make economic regulations-regulations which presumably
had the support of a majority of Americans. It is easy to see how popular
regard for the Court might be diminished by its declaring such an amend-
ment invalid.
Judicial review of the amending process, if abused, would confirm
the worst suspicions of those who accuse the Court of being a "super-
legislature." Some modern observers have suggested that this danger-
not so much the actual risk that the Court will improperly invalidate
amendments which seek to curb its power, but rather the risk that the
people will think the Court is deciding on this basis-would justify the
relegation of all issues affecting the amending process to the status of
"prudential" political questions. 121
But the argument proves too much. It fails to consider the alternative.
Perhaps the best cure for popular cynicism over the Court's role as a
"super-legislature"-a body concerned with imposing the policies fa-
vored by its members rather than with construing the Constitution accord-
ing to neutral principles-is simply judicial restraint. Even the loosest
constructionists ought to be persuaded of the wisdom of a strict exegetical
approach when the Court is deciding whether the Constitution has been
amended. If there is one class of cases in which the Justices ought to strive
to forget their personal sympathies, to use a "mechanical" formula
involving text, intent and logic, this must be it. Respect for the Court and
for the Constitution itself-not in the sense of agreement with every
pronouncement, but in the more important sense of a willingness to be
governed, born of confidence in the integrity of the institutions-demands
that the rules be the same for all amendments; it is particularly important
to apply the same rules to amendments which would limit the Court's role
and to those which would expand it. Whatever the Court's proper role
issues were justiciable. Roosevelt appointees Black, Frankfurter and Douglas were
joined by Roberts, regarded as a "swing man" on the New Deal, in advocating a
sweeping doctrine of Congressional power over the constitutional amending proc-
ess. Chief Justice Hughes and Justice Stone, regarded as "moderates," were joined
by Reed, the most "conservative" Roosevelt appointee, in taking a "middle
course." Political and economic analyses of Supreme Court voting are generally not
helpful and often misleading (see Wechsler, supra note 33, at 13-14), but when so
little reason and authority can be given for such a radical change in jurisprudence,
resort to these sources is perhaps necessary.
121. This "hot potato" analysis of Coleman is advanced in Scharpf, supra note
33, at 587-89.
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when it construes provisions universally accepted as part of the Constitu-
tion, it must be no more than a "referee" when deciding whether a
provision is in the Constitution at all.
The case for judicial restraint in reviewing constitutional amendment
procedures is based on the assumption that when a controversy arises in
this area, the final decision must rest with someone who can be counted on
to "adjudicate" rather than to "legislate." Constitutional amendments
may be designed to overturn Court decisions, but they may also seek to
limit (or to enhance) the powers of Congress, of the President, or of the
states. Since it is impossible to find a final arbiter without an institutional
conflict of interest, it is essential that the ultimate power of decision rest
with the branch most likely to find and apply the law without injecting its
own interests and passions. By disposition, by training, and by their
relative insulation from the political process, the Justices of the Supreme
Court are more capable of rendering such a neutral judgment than Con-
gressmen, Presidents and state legislators. 122
Congress has something of a bad track record at adjudication. The
handling of the 1868 resolution concerning the rescissions of Ohio and
New Jersey is a case in point.12 The impeachment of Andrew Johnson, on
what are now generally acknowledged to be unconstitutional grounds, is
another. 124 A candidate who challenges the official results of a congres-
sional election seems more likely to convince the House or Senate that his
cause is just if he is a member of the majority party. 125 A conviction after
impeachment, or a congressional judgment as to the qualifications of a
122. This point is at the heart of the "special function" argument for judicial
review. See the text at notes 42-44, supra. It has been suggested that while the
Court might be the most suitable forum for final review of ordinary legislation, this
"functional" argument does not apply to constitutional amendments. Professor
Orfield suggests exactly the contrary: "If orderly procedure is essential in the
enactment of ordinary statutes, should it not be even more so as to the adoption of
important and permanent constitutional amendments?"ORFIELD, supra note 4, at
21.
123. See the text at notes 71-80, supra.
124. See note 77, supra.
125. See 107 CONG. REC. 24 (1961) (Indiana officials certified Republican as
winner of House seat; motion to seat the Republican pending congressional investi-
gation of close election rejected, 166 Republicans in favor, 252 Democrats opposed.
Party breakdown at 17 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 401, 506 (1961)); 121 CONG. REC.
S1014-15 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1975) (motion to seat Republican certified as winner of
close New Hampshire Senate election, pending investigation, rejected 34-58, with
only one Democrat in favor and only one Republican opposed. Party breakdown at
31 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 700, 2-S (1975)). See also D. MORGAN, CONGRESS AND THE
CONSTITUTION 122-139, esp. 132 table 4 (1966).
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Congressman, may not be subject to judicial review, even if based on
unconstitutional grounds.' 26 The record in these areas, however, suggests
that it would hardly be wise for the Court to surrender "prudentially" to
Congress the power to say whether an amendment has become part of the
Constitution.
Even assuming every Congress would rise above partisan politics,
and would also separate the issue of an amendment's desirability from the
question of whether it had been properly passed, it would be virtually
impossible to eliminate the problem of inconsistent adjudications. One
Congress would not have the power to bind all future Congresses.
27
Dealing with the E.R.A., Congress might find that a state has no constitu-
tional power to rescind its ratification. Five years later, a different Con-
gress might read the Constitution and reach the opposite conclusion. Since
this is a question of law and not of fact, it would seem that an adjudication
by a subsequent Congress-even though made in the context of another
amendment-would have the effect of raising new constitutional doubts as
to the validity of amendments previously thought to have been ratified.
The other side of the coin is equally unappealing. Suppose, in the
context of an amendment strongly favored by Congress, a question of law
was decided in a way which made it possible to amend the Constitution
rather easily. Subsequently, when considering a drastic and demagogic
amendment which had clearly negotiated this lower hurdle, Congress
would be unable to reverse itself without giving rise to justified skepticism
about the integrity of the constitutional amending process. Of course, the
Court would face the same dilemma if it made such a decision. However,
it is submitted that the Court would be more likely, when considering the
"nice" amendment, to keep in mind the possibility that "bad" amend-
ments would be proposed in the future, and thus not arrive at a strained
interpretation of Article V in the service of easing the path of the former.
It can be argued that inconsistent standards ought to be applied to
different amendments-that a close question of law should be decided one
way so that the Equal Rights Amendment will pass, and another way if it
is necessary to defeat a proposal to repeal the Bill of Rights. Even if one
were to accept this idea, with all it implies about how seriously one really
takes the concept of a rule of laws and not of men, it would be bad to
repose in Congress the discretion as to which amendments are subjected to
"strict scrutiny." It has been suggested that the Court should refrain from
126. But see Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486(1969), discussed in the text at
notes 146-59, infra.
127. See note 29, supra.
[Vol. 37
COMMENTS
adjudicating the question of ratification, since it might have a stake in the
outcome. 128 But Congress has a bigger stake, not only insofar as Congres-
sional power might be limited or expanded by a proposed amendment, but
also in that Congress always plays a role in the proposal of the amend-
ment.129 Elihu Root stated the effect of giving Congress the dual roles of
proponent and supreme judge:
It would certainly be vain for a constitution to declare or imply
limitations upon the power to amend it, if those limitations could be
transgressed at will by the very persons who were intended by the
people to be restrained and confined .... 130
It must be noted that the sympathies of Congress will, with rare excep-
tions, be in favor of the amendments it has proposed by a two-thirds
margin.' 3' To concede to Congress the right to apply inconsistent stand-
ards to questions of law, with the underlying assumption that policy
considerations will influence the application of these standards, is to give
Congress the power to amend the Constitution unilaterally when it favors
the amendment; and to block amendments through a third political step,
after proposal and ratification, when it opposes them.
1 32
The members of the Constitutional Convention feared that Congress
might gain such power. Edmond Randolph's original proposed Constitu-
tion expressly provided that the Constitution should be amended "without
requiring the assent of the National Legislature." 33 Every member whose
reflections on the matter have been preserved seems to have assumed that
since the Constitution was a limitation on the powers of Congress, and on
the powers of a majority of the states to harm the interests of a minority, it
was important to protect the amending process from manipulation by
Congress or even by a simple majority of the states.134 Only one member
of the convention was outspoken in favor of a major role for Congress in
the amending process, and his proposals were defeated. 135 Not until the
128. See the text & notes 121-22, supra.
129. Article V provides that amendments may be proposed either by a two-
thirds vote of each house of Congress, or by a convention called by Congress at the
request of two-thirds of the state legislatures. It has been suggested that Congress
might have wide discretion in regulating such a convention. See 1967 Hearings,
supra note 28, passim. But see materials cited in note 61, supra.
130. See Dodd, supra note 66, at 323.
131. However, Congress might oppose an amendment proposed by the conven-
tion method, or by a previous Congress.
132. See illustrations in the text at notes 167-69, infra.
133. 1 FARRAND, supra note 20, at 117; see l id. at 22.
134. See l id. at 202-03; 2 id. at 629-31; 3 id. at 367-68; 4 id. at 61.
135. See 2 id. at 467-68; 3 id. at 367-78.
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last week of the Convention was it decided to give Congress any more than
a ministerial role even in the proposal of amendments; 36 later, Hamilton
defended the arrangement by pointing to the limited congressional role,
and observing:
We may safely rely on the disposition of the State legislatures to erect
barriers against the encroachments of the national authority. 137
It is submitted that the concerns which moved the framers to limit the
role of Congress are still important. Even those who regard state or
sectional interests as unworthy of protection must acknowledge that the
Constitution protects other minority interests; and that these interests are
equally threatened by granting a single majoritarian institution the effec-
tive power to amend the Constitution, as they would be by granting that
same institution the final authority on all matters of constitutional interpre-
tation.
A final reason must be advanced against the Court's abrogation of its
authority: in each case, consider the worst that could possibly happen.
Hamilton called the Supreme Court the "least dangerous" branch of
government, not because it will always reach the right decision, but
because it has "neither force nor will, but merely judgment." '138 The
worst fears of the most unrelenting opponents of judicial power can never
be realized, without at least the acquiescence of the other branches of
government. Generally, such co-operation will be forthcoming, even
when the other branches disagree with the construction of the Constitution
put forth by the Court. However, a truly corrupt decision, an attempted
judicial coup d'etat, might not be enforced; and the knowledge of this
would presumably deter even a thoroughly corrupt judge. If it were to
become firmly established, however, that Congress was the final judge of
the validity of constitutional amendments, such a coup, in the form of a
proposal of an amendment followed by a declaration that it had been
ratified, would be irresistible except by armed rebellion.
Baker, Powell, and the Rejection of Unprincipled Avoidance
Subsequent Supreme Court cases leave considerable doubt about the
vitality of the political questions doctrine, and particularly about whether
there is anything left of Coleman. It was in Baker v. Carr,3 9 the
legislative reapportionment case, that Justice Brennan listed the traditional
136. See 2 id. at 557-59.
137. THE FEDERALIST No. 85 (A. Hamilton).
138. Id. No. 78 (A. Hamilton).
139. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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bases of the political questions doctrine, including the "impossibility of
deciding" because of a lack of manageable evidence or a need to make
policy judgments; 40 but the holdings in that case and its progeny suggest
that the "impossibility" category may be an empty set. 4' Certainly the
evidence in Coleman was no more complicated, no more "social, political
and economic, ' 142 than that which the federal courts have routinely
considered in reapportionment cases. Baker also held that issues involving
state governments are not political questions, 143 implicitly overruling prior
cases. ' Since it is the state legislatures whose procedures are in question,
this may mean the Court will not hesitate to rule on whether these
procedures are constitutional. '4 5 Nor should a declaration by Congress
make any difference; if Congress should declare Tennessee's legislature to
be apportioned constitutionally, there is no reason to believe the Court
would accept this determination as conclusive.
Powell v. McCormack46 was perhaps the most important political
questions case in this century. Reacting to allegations of crime and abuse
of office by Adam Clayton Powell, Congress voted to exclude him at the
beginning of the session. This was almost certainly unconstitutional, since
the Constitution prescribes only age, citizenship and residence as qualifi-
cations for the office, 147 and provides that Congress may "expel" a
member only by a two-thirds vote.148 It seemed, however, that Congress
would succeed in "expelling" Powell under the pretext of "excluding"
him,"' since the right of Congress to judge the qualifications of its own
140. Id. at 217. The passage referred to is reproduced in the text at note 50,
supra.
141. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); GUNTHER, supra note 44,
at 1621 & n.3.
142. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 453 (1939).
143. 369 U.S. at 210.
144. See Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78 (1909); Scharpf, supra note 33, at 538
n.73.
145. When they ratify, the state legislatures are performing a "federal func-
tion." See the text at notes 6-8, supra. However, the basis on which state actions
are distinguished from Federal actions in Baker is apparently that the former can be
invalidated without a risk of "embarrassment" to co-ordinate branches of the
federal government; this "prudential" distinction should put all state legislative
actions within reach of the federal judiciary.
146. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
147. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2.
148. Id. art. I, § 5.
149. The motion to "exclude" Powell did carry by the two-thirds which would
have been necessary to "expel" him; but the Court expressed doubt as to whether
the required two-thirds vote would have been obtained ifthe motion had been to
expel. 395 U.S. at 508-10.
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members is the strongest case of a "textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment" of an issue to resolution by a branch other than the Court. 150
Chief Justice Warren, however, speaking for a nearly unanimous
Court'51 (including, perhaps significantly, Justice Black), ruled that Pow-
ell had a right to his seat. The Court announced a view of the political
questions doctrine even narrower than the classical view: 5 2
[A] determination of petitioner Powell's right to sit would require no
more than an interpretation of the Constitution. Such a determination
falls within the traditional role accorded courts to interpret the law
. . . . Our system of government requires that federal courts on
occasion interpret the constitution in a manner at variance with the
construction given the document by another branch. The alleged
conflict that such an adjudication may cause cannot justify the courts'
avoiding their constitutional responsibility. 153
The Court examined each of the criteria listed in Baker v. Carr, and
found them inapplicable. Most significantly, Powell seems to say that
even a broad constitutional grant of adjudicative power to Congress may
not be exercised unconstitutionally; the only unreviewable power Con-
gress might have would be to determine whether Powell in fact met the
qualifications of age, citizenship and residence.' 54
150. Impeachment is the only other example of an explicit textual commitment
which had been thought unreviewable by the Court. See Wechsler, supra note 33,
at 8.
151. Only Justice Stewart dissented, on grounds of mootness. Justice Douglas
filed a separate concurring opinion. 395 U.S. at 551-74.
152. The Court's cursory citation of the various types of "prudential" consid-
erations listed in Baker is deceptive in light of the concluding statement that
whenever "an interpretation of the Constitution" is all a case calls for, these
"prudential" considerations are automatically absent. Id. at 549. This statement,
for which the Court relies on Marbury, would indicate an effective return to the
classical view of the political question. But the Court's willingness to overlook an
apparent "textual commitment" of the issue to resolution by Congress suggests an
even narrower view.
153. Id. at 548-49.
154. The Court explicitly leaves this question open. Id. at 520-21 & n.41. Justice
Douglas, concurring, states that a determination of fact by Congress as to a
member's qualifications would be unreviewable. Id. at 552. Thus, by falsely "find-
ing" Powell to be under 25 years of age, Congress might have insulated its decision
from judicial review. This distinction-that congressional determinations of fact
may be unreviewable, whereas questions of law will always be reviewed by the
court-is applied to the amending process by then-Judge Stevens in Dyer v. Blair,
390 F. Supp. 1291, 1301-03 & n.24 (N.D. I11. 1975). Under this analysis, a certifica-
tion by state legislative officials, or perhaps by the federal official authorized to
certify ratifications, that a state had voted to rescind, would be conclusive on the
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Professor Gunther has expressed doubt whether, after Powell, "any
constitutional questions remain which the Court is likely to find committed
to other branches for final decision." 55 Certainly the "prudential" con-
siderations were as strong in Powell, where Congress had already made its
decision as to its internal affairs, as they would be in a constitutional
amendment case, where Congress might or might not have expressed a
view on the question. And the "textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment" was much stronger in Powell than in any Article V case.' 56
Since whether a state may rescind its ratification, like whether Congress
could exclude Powell, is a pure question of law which "would require no
more than an interpretation of the Constitution,"'' 57 the Court should not
hesitate to decide the issue.
The contribution made by the Court in Powell to a sound resolution
of the controversy over the amending process was not limited to its
undermining of the theoretical foundations of Coleman. The Powell Court
also confronted a number of past instances of Congressional "exclusion"
of constitutionally qualified members-elect, and found the value of such
precedents "quite limited." The notion underlying Coleman-that if the
Court finds a precedent in past Congressional action, it need not undertake
its own evaluation of the constitutionality of such action'-was summar-
ily rejected:
That an unconstitutional action has been taken before surely does not
render that same action any less unconstitutional at a later date ...
The relevancy of [such] cases is limited largely to the insights they
afford in correctly ascertaining the draftsmen's intent. Obviously,
therefore, the precedential value of these cases tends to increase in
proportion to their proximity to the Convention in 1787."59
Given the time, circumstances and manner of its adoption, it would be
difficult to underestimate the value of the Reconstruction resolution on
rescission of proposed amendments as an aid in determining the intent of
the framers of Article V. Accordingly, after Powell all authority for the
proposition that rescission is a political question-i.e., the Reconstruction
resolution and the dictum in Coleman relying on that resolution-should
be regarded as obsolete.
Court; but the legal effect of such a vote would be decided by the Court itself. See
id. at 1301 n.24.
155. GUNTHER, supra note 44, at 482.
156. See the text at notes 53-58, supra.
157. 395 U.S. at 548.
158. See the text at note 104, supra.
159. 395 U.S. at 546-47.
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Justice Stevens and the E.R.A.
The Coleman doctrine of partial non-justiciability of constitutional
amendment questions was never accepted very enthusiastically by the
lower federal courts, which tended to use guarded language about justicia-
bility and then rule on the merits as to adoption of constitutional amend-
ments. 16 The recent opinion in Dyer v. Blair 6' deserves noting because it
involves ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment and because it was
written by Justice Stevens shortly before his accession to the Supreme
Court.
A majority of the members of the Illinois House and Senate had voted
to ratify the E.R.A. A legislative rule, however, required a three-fifths
majority vote, so the ratifying resolution failed. Plaintiffs, members of the
legislature, argued that this rule was unconstitutional and requested that
the court enjoin state officials to certify ratification.
Then-Judge Stevens rejected defendants' contention "that Congress
has sole and complete control over the entire amending process, subject to
no judicial review."' 62 He pointed out that Justice Black's Coleman
opinion was not the opinion of the Court, and that the Supreme Court had
previously rejected the "political question" contention. Applying Baker
and Powell, the court found that a mere interpretation of the Constitution
was required, and that the risk of conflict with the views of Congress could
not justify a failure to decide. The court distinguished the Hughes opinion
in Coleman on the ground that there was no explicit congressional prece-
dent concerning "super-majority" requirements and on the ground that,
unlike the "reasonable time" involved in Coleman, the meaning of the
term "ratification" must be the same for every amendment proposed by
Congress, and therefore is a non-political question.' 63
The Dyer opinion contains a thorough exposition of the history and
purpose of Article V, as well as the Supreme Court opinions prior to
Coleman, which indicates that Justice Stevens regards the amending
process as justiciable, virtually in its entirety."6 Had Dyer been a Su-
160. See, e.g., Trombetta v. Florida, 353 F. Supp. 575 (M.D. Fla. 1973); Petus-
key v. Rampton, 307 F. Supp. 235 (D. Utah 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 431 F.2d
378 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 913 (1971); United States v. Gugel, 119
F. Supp. 897 (E.D. Ky. 1954).
161. 390 F. Supp. 1291 (N.D. I11. 1975).
162. Id. at 1299.
163. Id. at 1302-03.
164. Id'. at 1302-07. Then-Judge Stevens clearly regarded the history and text of
Article V as susceptible of judicial interpretation; the point of law he decided is
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preme Court decision rather than the opinion of a three-judge panel, it is
unlikely that such care would have been taken to distinguish Coleman.165
The reasoning of Coleman is clearly inconsistent with that of Powell, 1
66
and then-Judge Stevens applied the latter to the constitutional amending
process in Dyer.
Conclusion
The constitutional requirement of a consensus of three-fourths of the
states for ratification can only be met by recognizing that a state can
rescind its ratification of a proposed amendment. This is a question of
constitutional law which must be decided in a court, not by Congress. The
view that the question is justiciable and that states may rescind is consist-
ent with the text and the history of Article V, with all Supreme Court cases
prior to Coleman v. Miller, with the nearly unanimous view in the state
courts, and with the reasoning of federal court decisions since Coleman.
The limitations placed on the political questions doctrine by Baker v. Carr
and Powell v. McCormack clearly render the question of rescission justici-
able.
The contrary view-that whether states may rescind is a political
question-is supported only by the resolution of the Reconstruction Con-
gress, and by dictum in the discredited Coleman decision.
For those whose enthusiasm for the particular amendment now being
considered might incline them to a "prudential" view that rescission
should be a political question, it might be instructive to consider a few
possible consequences of this view:
1) Immediately after proposal of an amendment by Congress, all but
one of the needed states ratify. The amendment then stalls due to sectional
opposition. Two years later, an unexpected consequence of the yet-
unratified amendment comes to light, perhaps because of court decisions
perhaps less explicit on the face of Article V than the question of whether rescis-
sion is permissible.
165. Then-Judge Stevens felt bound by strict rules of stare decisis. See id. at
1299-1300. It is significant that his opinion advances a logical defense of the
Coleman holding that Congress may determine a "reasonable time," but simply
notes, and distinguishes, Coleman on the question of prior rejections and ratifica-
tions. Id. at 1301-02 & n.25.
166. The Coleman holding as to "reasonable time" may be consistent with
Powell. See the text at notes 107-10 & 165, supra. But since the effect of prior
ratification would seem to call simply for an interpretation of the Constitution, it
seems impossible to reconcile the Coleman dictum on this question with Powell.
Cf. Dyer v. Blair, 390 F. Supp. 1291, 1301 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
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in related areas. Constitutional scholars are agreed that the amendment
would have this undesirable effect. All 37 previously ratifying states
rescind, but Congress (perhaps feeling compelled by its prior decision
regarding the E.R.A.) declares the rescissions invalid. Any one state is
now free to make the amendment part of the Constitution, even if no other
state now favors the amendment.
2) Sufficient states have apparently ratified an amendment, but pro-
cedural attacks have been made on the ratifications of several states.
Congress considers the question, the House concluding that the amend-
ment is part of the Constitution, the Senate concluding it is not. The
stalemate continues, and eventually the Supreme Court hears a case which
must turn on whether the amendment is valid. It cannot be argued that the
amendment is invalid unless "approved" by both houses, since ratifica-
tion occurs as of the date the last state ratifies. Very simply, either the
House or the Senate is wrong, and the Court, having ruled the matter a
"political question," is powerless to act. 167
3) The Louisiana Legislature, on the same day, ratifies both the
Equal Rights Amendment and an anti-abortion amendment. One week
later, the legislature votes to rescind both amendments. Congress rules
that Louisiana may rescind the E.R.A., but not the anti-abortion amend-
ment.
4) The ultimate scenario, wherein Congress proposes an amend-
ment, then immediately declares that it has been ratified, has already been
suggested. Variations make the idea more plausible: Suppose Congress
perceived a "national emergency" and declared that any state not explicit-
ly rejecting the amendment within two weeks would be deemed to have
ratified? 16
8
5) Note that a joint resolution of Congress only requires a simple
majority in each House. Thus Congress could "judge" a proposal which
received less than two-thirds of the votes cast, perhaps declaring the
proposal effective on the basis that absent members might have voted in
favor. If there is no judicial review, a simple majority in Congress could
effectively propose and ratify an amendment.
167. Some authorities have also suggested that the President must have a role in
any congressional action on an amendment, other than the act of proposing. Black,
supra note 28, at 206-09; 1967 Hearings, supra note 28, at 23-24 (statements of
Senators Tydings and Proxmire). A presidential veto could thus prevent resolution
of any political questions involved in determining the validity of an amendment.
168. Similar arguments, directed more to partisan politics than to constitutional
exegesis, were advanced in the 1868 Senate debate over the effect of Ohio's
rescission. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 876-78 (1868).
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Constitutional law scholars will recognize here the traditional
"parade of horribles. ' "69 These are extreme examples; a longer list could
be compiled of more plausible dangers partaking of the elements of the
above. Yet, perhaps alone among decisions the Court can make, the
declaration that an issue is a political question attaches to all cases
involving the issue, not just those in which the doctrine is convenient. 170
So those who would drag Tennessee, Nebraska and Idaho, kicking and
screaming, into an artificial constitutional consensus, leaving the construc-
tion of Article V forever in the hands of Congress, are leading the parade.
Grover Rees III
169. Credit for promulgating this phrase has been given to Thomas Reed Powell.
Arnold, Professor Hart's Theology, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1298, 1305 & n.26 (1960). It is
a venerable technique, and a good one for evaluating the possible effects of actions
which may be irreversible. Thus Professor Black calls our attention to the dimen-
sions of the amending power: it can ". . . change the presidency to a committee of
three, hobble the treaty power, make the federal judiciary elective, repeal the
fourth amendment, make Catholics ineligible for office, and move the national
capital to Topeka. These are (in part at least) cartoon illustrations. But the cartoon
accurately renders the de jure picture, and seems exaggerated only because we now
conceive that at least some of these actions have no appeal to anybody." Black,
The Proposed Amendment of Article V: A Threatened Disaster, 72 YALE L.J. 957,
959 (1963).
170. It is suggested, for instance, that even the Court's deplorable decision on
the merits in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), the Japanese
exclusion case, was preferable to Justice Jackson's suggestion that the issue be
declared a political question (id. at 242-48), since this would have been a declaration
by the Court that it would never have authority to intervene in any case involving
similar government repression of American citizens in time of war. See Scharpf,
supra note 33, at 535-38, 562-66.
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